On the Size of the Active Management Industry by Lubos Pastor & Robert F. Stambaugh
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We are grateful for comments from Andrew Ang, Amil Dasgupta, Lord John Eatwell, Gene Fama,
Vincent Glode, Will Goetzmann, Rick Green, Rich Kihlstrom, Ralph Koijen, Kim Min, Dimitris Papanikolaou,
Monika Piazzesi, Luke Taylor, Rob Vishny, Guofu Zhou, three anonymous referees, workshop participants
at Chicago, Drexel, Emory, Michigan State, Ohio State, Temple, and Wharton, as well as participants
in the meetings of the NBER Asset Pricing Program, Western Finance Association, European Finance
Association, Cambridge/Penn conference, HEC Finance and Statistics Conference, Institutional Investor
conference at the University of Texas at Austin, CFA Annual Conference, and Q-Group. Support as
an Initiative for Global Markets Visiting Fellow (Stambaugh) at the University of Chicago is gratefully
acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Lubos Pastor and Robert F. Stambaugh. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.On the Size of the Active Management Industry
Lubos Pastor and Robert F. Stambaugh
NBER Working Paper No. 15646
January 2010, Revised July 2012
JEL No. G10,G20
ABSTRACT
We argue that active management’s popularity is not puzzling despite the industry’s poor track record.
Our explanation features decreasing returns to scale: As the industry’s size increases, every manager’s
ability to outperform passive benchmarks declines. The poor track record occurred before the growth
of indexing modestly reduced the share of active management to its current size. At this size, better
performance is expected by investors who believe in decreasing returns to scale. Such beliefs persist
because persistence in industry size causes learning about returns to scale to be slow. The industry
should shrink only moderately if its underperformance continues.
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Active asset management remains popular, even though its track record has long been unim-
pressive. For example, consider actively managed equity mutual funds, which constitute a large
and well-researched segment of the active management industry. Numerous studies report that
these funds have provided investors with average returns signiﬁcantly below those on passive
benchmarks.1 While this track record could help explain the growth of index funds, the total
size of index fundsis still modest compared to that of actively managed funds.2 Given the negative
track record, one might be puzzled by the enormous size of the active management industry.
We argue that the popularityof active management is not puzzling despite its poor track record.
Key to this conclusion is to realize that the active management industry faces decreasing returns
to scale: any fund manager’s ability to outperform a passive benchmark declines as the industry’s
size increases. As more money chases opportunities to outperform, prices are impacted and such
opportunities become more elusive. A simple way of modeling returns to scale is as follows:






where αt is the industry’s expected return at time t in excess of passive benchmarks and (S/W)t
is the industry’s size as a fraction of the total amount managed actively and passively. Decreasing
returns to scale are captured by b > 0. If the benchmarks are sufﬁcient for pricing assets in an
efﬁcient market, αt reﬂects asset mispricing. In that case, our modeling of decreasing returns to
scale is equivalent to assuming that mispricing is reduced as more money seeks to exploit it.
Decreasing returns to scale help us understand the continued popularity of active management.
Investors areuncertain about the industry’salpha, and they learn about it from realized returns. Af-
ter observing negative performance, investors infer that α is lower than expected, and they reduce
their allocation to active management. Indeed, the growth of indexing over the past few decades
has modestly reduced the shareof active management to itscurrent size. The factthat the reduction
in S/W has been modest is consistent with the cushioning provided by decreasing returns to scale:
a lower S/W implies a higher α going forward. Investors infer that α is too low at the current level
of S/W, but they know that α will go up after they reduce S/W, so they disinvest less than they
would if returns to scale were constant. Under decreasing returns to scale, past underperformance
does not imply futureunderperformance;it impliesonly that investors should allocate less to active
1See Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), Wermers (2000), P´ astor and Stambaugh (2002a), Fama and
French (2009), Del Guercio and Reuter (2011), and others. Fama and French report that, over the past 23 years, an
aggregate portfolioof U.S. equity mutual funds underperformed various benchmarks by about 1% per annum.
2The Investment Company Institute (2009) reports that assets of equity mutual funds total $3.8 trillion at the end
of 2008. They also report that 87% of those assets are under active management, as opposed to being index funds.
2management. After a period of underperformance, the optimal allocation to active management
should be smaller than it was at the beginning of the period, but it may remain substantial.
To explore the quantitative implications of the above story, we develop a model of active man-
agement featuring Sharpe-ratio-maximizing investors and fee-maximizing fund managers. We
model decreasing returnsto scale in a way similar to equation (1), with unknown parameters a and
b. We derive the model’s implications for the equilibrium size of the active management industry,
measured in relative terms as S/W. We also solve for the equilibrium α and the manager fee.
We ﬁnd that the industry’s equilibrium size depends critically on the degree of competition
among investors and fund managers. The role of competition is especially clear in the special
case in which investors are risk-neutral. In the absence of competition among either investors or
managers, the equilibrium industry size maximizes the expected total proﬁt. If investors compete
but managers do not, all the proﬁt goes to managers in the form of fees; if managers compete but
investors do not, all the proﬁt goes to investors in the form of alpha. A different picture emerges
under perfect competition among both investors and managers. Interestingly, the industry’s fully
competitive equilibrium size is twice as large as the size obtained if either type of competition is
shut down. The fully competitive industry produces zero expected total proﬁt, so that investors
earn zero alpha and managers earn no abnormal fee.
Our results highlight an externality that is inherent to active investing under decreasing returns
to scale: when investors compete, they dilute each other’s returns by investing to the point where
the expected active alpha is zero. Due to this externality, competition results in overproduction
of active management relative to the proﬁt-maximizing size, making it easier to understand why
active management is so popular. If more active management implies less mispricing, then more
competition also implies more efﬁcient asset markets. This result has clear policy implications.
Focusing on the fully competitive setting, we compare the model-implied equilibrium size of
the active management industry with the actual size. To measure the industry’s actual size, we
rely on data for U.S. equity mutual funds, which we assume to be representative of the industry
as a whole. The advantage of using mutual fund data is that the histories of fund returns and
assets under management are longer and more reliable than those of any other segment of the asset
management industry. We measure the industry’s actual S/W as assets under management for
all active funds divided by assets under management for active and passive funds combined. The
latest value of this ratio, computed as of the beginning of 2006, is 0.87.
We examine the conditions under which the rational investors in our model currently choose an
87% allocation to active management. The investors choose their allocations after updating their
3prior beliefs about a and b with the available historical data. The data consist of a 44-year history
of the actual S/W values and returns on the aggregate portfolio of actively managed U.S. equity
mutual funds. This history paints an unfavorable view of active funds, whose aggregate portfolio
has signiﬁcantly underperformed the market.3 Despite the negative return history, we ﬁnd that the
87% allocation to active management is consistent with a variety of prior beliefs, as long as those
beliefs feature decreasing returns to scale. For example, for our baseline prior speciﬁcation for a,
the 87% allocation is chosen by investors who expect b to be about 0.1 a priori. Our results seem
robust to alternative prior speciﬁcations. We conclude that the observed large size of the active
management industry can be rationalized by decreasing returns to scale in the industry.
In contrast, active management’s popularity would seem quite puzzling under the more tradi-
tional assumption of constant returns to scale (b = 0 in equation (1)). This assumption is routinely
adopted by performance evaluation studies, in which alphas are generally treated as constants, un-
related to the industry’s size. We ﬁnd that under constant returns to scale, the current size of the
active management industry should be zero. With b = 0, the industry’s track record quickly leads
investors to perceive α < 0 at any S/W, even if their prior beliefs about α are more optimistic
than those leading to the results mentioned above under decreasing returns to scale. With α < 0,
any positive investment in active management would be undesirable for mean-variance investors;
they would instead go short if they could. If our rational investors thought returns to scale were
constant, the active management industry would have disappeared many years ago.
Is the industry likely to remain large in the future? To answer this question, we simulate future
paths of returns from our model under prior beliefs that are consistent with the industry’s current
size. We then calculate the expected future industry size after observing various potential track
records. We ﬁnd that S/W is likely to remain large for a long time, even if the industry continues
to signiﬁcantly underperform its benchmark. For example, conditional on the future t-statistic
of alpha equal to -2, S/W is expected to decline only to 63.4% after 20 years. The industry’s
decline in response to underperformance is restrained by decreasing returns to scale: investors
know that when they allocate less to active management, their future active returns will be higher.
In contrast, the industry would shrink much faster in response to underperformance if returns to
scale were constant: for example, for the same t-statistic of -2, the industry would disappear after
just one year of underperformance, which seems implausible. We conclude that due to decreasing
returns to scale, the active management industry is likely to remain large for many years.
Our proposed reconciliation of the active management industry’s large size with its poor track
3When we regress aggregate active fundexcess returnson market excess returnsin ourfull sample of January 1962
through September 2006, the annualized estimated alpha is -88 basis points, with the t-statistic of -2.7. Our data,
which come from Ken French, are described in more detail in Section III.B.
4record is the main contribution of this paper. Our second contribution is to show that learning
about returns to scale in active management is slow. Investors in our model face endogeneity that
limits their learning about a and b in equation (1). As investors update their beliefs about a and
b, they adjust S/W. They learn about a and b by observing the industry’s returns that follow
different allocations. The extent to which they learn is thus endogenous—what they learn affects
how much they allocate, but what they allocate affects how much they learn. At the extreme, if
investors were to keep S/W constant over time, they would eventually learn the value of α at that
level of S/W, but they would learn nothing about a and b individually. While the equilibrium
S/W generally does vary over time, its ﬂuctuations are signiﬁcantly muted by decreasing returns
to scale. This lack of variation in S/W impedes learning about a and b. As a result, investors
remain highly uncertain about a and b even after observing long histories of data. For the same
reason, the investors’ initial beliefs about returns to scale persist for a long time.
Our reliance on decreasing returns to scale in active management owes a debt to the innovative
use of this concept by Berk and Green (2004), although our focus and implementation are quite
different. Berk and Green assume that an individual fund’s returns are decreasing in its own size
rather than in the total amount of active management. In their model, as investors update their
beliefs about each manager’s skill, funds with positive track records attract new money and grow
in size, while funds with negative track records experience withdrawals and shrink in size. In re-
ality, actively managed funds have a signiﬁcantly negative aggregate track record, yet the active
management industry remains large. We address this apparent “active-management puzzle.” De-
parting from Berk and Green’s cross-sectional focus, we analyze the aggregate size of the active
management industry.
We are not alone in trying to explain the puzzling popularity of active management in light
of its poor track record. In our explanation, investors do not expect negative past performance to
continue, but in other explanations they do. Gruber (1996) suggests that some “disadvantaged” in-
vestors areinﬂuenced by advertising and brokers,institutional arrangements,or tax considerations.
Glode (2011) presents an explanation in which investors expect negative future performance as a
fair tradeoff for counter-cyclical performance by fund managers. Savov (2009) argues that active
funds underperform passive indices but they do not underperform actual index fund investments,
because investors buy in and out of index funds at the wrong time. We do not imply that such
alternative explanations play no role in resolving the puzzle. We simply suggest that the same job
can be accomplished with rational investors who do not expect underperformance going forward.
A numberofstudiesaddresslearningaboutmanagerialskill,butnoneofthem considerlearning
about returns to scale, nor do they analyze the size of the active management industry. Baks,
5Metrick, and Wachter (2001) examine track records of active mutual funds and ﬁnd that extremely
skeptical prior beliefs about skill would be required to produce zero investment in all funds. They
solve the Bayesian portfolio problem fund by fund, whereas P´ astor and Stambaugh (2002b) and
Avramov and Wermers (2006) construct optimal portfolios of funds. Other studies that model
learning about managerial skill with a focus different from ours include Lynch and Musto (2003),
Berk and Green (2004), Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007), and Dangl, Wu, and Zechner (2008).
Our study relates to a number of other directions in recent research. Viewed broadly, the study
adds to a growing literature addressing the size of various aspects of the ﬁnancial industry (e.g.,
Philippon, 2008, and Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman, 2011). Garcia and Vanden (2009) analyze
mutual fundformationin ageneral equilibriumsetting with privateinformation. In theirmodel, the
size of the mutual fund industry follows from the agents’ information acquisition decisions. Asset
prices are determined endogenously in their model but not in ours; in that sense, our approach
can be described as partial equilibrium, similar to Berk and Green (2004).4 Recent models of
mutual fund formation also include Mamaysky and Spiegel (2002) and Stein (2005). Neither these
models nor Garcia and Vanden examine the roles of learning and past data. A number of studies
examine equilibrium fee setting by money managers, which occurs in our model as well. Nanda,
Narayanan, and Warther (2000) do so in a model in which a fund’s return before fees is affected by
liquidity costs that increase in fund size. Fee setting is also examined by Chordia (1996) and Das
and Sundaram (2002), among others. Finally, Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2005) empirically
analyze the determinants of the size of the mutual fund industry across countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our model. After describing the general
setting, we ﬁrst examine the case in which investors are risk-neutral. The simple results obtained
there for alphas, fees, and industry size clearly reveal the role of competition among managers
and investors. We then move to a mean-variance setting, which forms the basis for our empirical
work. Section III discusses thepriorsand their updating with data. Section IV presents themodel’s
quantitative implications for the industry’s current size given its historical track record. Section V
calculates the expected future industry size after observing various potential future track records.
It also discusses the properties of learning about returns to scale. Section VI relates our model to
that of Berk and Green (2004). Section VII concludes.
4In additionto Garcia and Vanden (2009), recent examples of studies that analyze the effect of delegated portfolio
management on equilibrium asset prices also include Cuoco and Kaniel (2011), Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011),
Guerrieri and Kondor (2011), He and Krishnamurthy (2012), Vayanos and Woolley (2008), and Petajisto (2009).
6II. Model
A. Setting
We model two types of agents—fund managers and investors. There are M active fund man-
agers who have the potential ability to identify and exploit opportunities to outperform passive
benchmarks. There are N investors who allocate their wealth across the M active funds as well
as the passive benchmarks. We focus primarily on a perfectly competitive setting with inﬁnite
numbers of both managers and investors who play inﬁnitesimal individual roles in equilibrium
(M → ∞, N → ∞). To emphasize the important role of competition when there are decreas-
ing returns to scale, we also consider two alternative settings. In one there is perfect competition
among managers but only a single investor (M → ∞, N = 1), while in the other there is perfect
competition among investors but only a single manager (M = 1, N → ∞).
The rates of return earned by investors in the managers’ funds obey the regression model
rF = α + βrP + u, (2)
where rF is the M ×1 vector of fund returns in excess of the riskless rate, α is the M ×1 vector of
fund alphas, rP is the excess return on the passive benchmark portfolio, β is the M × 1 vector of
fund betas, and u is the M × 1 vector of the residuals. The passive benchmark portfolio’s excess
return has mean µP and varianceσ2
P. We suppress timesubscripts throughout,to simplifynotation.
The elements of the residual vector u have the following factor structure:
ui = x + ￿i, (3)
for i = 1,...,M, where all ￿i’s have a mean of zero, variance of σ2
￿, and zero correlationwith each
other. The common factor x has mean zero and variance σ2
x. The values of β, µP, σP, σx, and σ￿
are constants known to both investors and managers.
The factor structure in equation (3) means that the benchmark-adjusted returns of skilled man-
agers are correlated, as long as σx > 0. Skill is the ability to identify opportunities to outperform
passive benchmarks, so the same opportunities are likely to be identiﬁed by multiple skilled man-
agers. Therefore, multiple managers are likely to hold some of the same positions, resulting in
correlated benchmark-adjusted returns.5 As a result, the risk associated with active investing can-
not be fully diversiﬁed away by investing in a large number of funds.
The expected benchmark-adjusted dollar proﬁt received in total by fund i’s investors and man-
ager isdenoted by πi. Our key assumption isthat πi isdecreasing inS/W, whereS istheaggregate
5This correlation can be ampliﬁed if the managers employ leverage because then negative shocks to the commonly
employed strategy lead cash-constrained managers to unwind their positions, magnifying the initial shock.
7size of theactivemanagement industry, and W is equal to S plustheamount invested in thepassive
benchmark. Dividing S by W reﬂects the notion that the industry’s relative (rather than absolute)
size is relevant for capturing decreasing returns to scale in active management. In order to obtain








where si is the size of manager i’s fund, with S =
PM
i=1 si. The parameters a and b in equation (4)





























where D denotes the set of information available to investors.
The parameter a represents the expected return on the initial small fraction of wealth invested
in active management, net of proportional costs and managerial compensation in a competitive
setting. It seems likely that a > 0, although we do not preclude a < 0. If no money were invested
in activemanagement, no managers wouldbesearching foropportunitiesto outperformthepassive
benchmarks, so some opportunities would likely be present. The initial active investment picks
low-hanging fruit, so it is likely to have a positive expected benchmark-adjusted return.
The parameter b determines the degree to which the expected benchmark-adjusted return for
any manager declines as the relative size of active management increases. We allow b ≥ 0, al-
though it is likely that b > 0 due to decreasing returns to scale in the active management industry.
As more money chases opportunities to outperform, prices are impacted, and such opportunities
become more difﬁcult for any manager to identify. Prices are impacted by these proﬁt-chasing
actions of active managers unless markets are perfectly liquid. In that sense, b is related to market
liquidity: b = 0 in inﬁnitely liquid markets but b > 0 otherwise.
We specify the relation (4) exogenously, but decreasing returns to aggregate scale can also
arise endogenously in a richer model. In the model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), for example,
traders can choose to become informed by paying a cost, and the proportion of informed traders is
determined in equilibrium. As this proportion rises, expected utility of the informed traders falls
relative to that of the uninformed traders, similar in spirit to equation (4).
Manager i charges a proportional fee at rate fi. This is a fee that the fund manager sets while
taking into account its effect on the fund’s size. The value of fi, known to investors when making




Combining this fee structure with (4), we obtain the following relation for the ith element of α:
αi = a − b
S
W
− fi . (8)
The relation between αi and the amount of active investment is plotted in Figure 1.
The N investors are assumed to allocate between the active funds and the benchmark portfolio
so as to maximize the Sharpe ratio of the resulting combination. Let δj denote the M ×1 vector of













where the excess return on the investor’s portfolio is given by
rj = δ
0
jrF + (1 − δ
0
jιM)rP , (10)
and ιM denotes an M-vector of ones. We impose the restriction that all elements of the M × 1
vector δj are non-negative (no shorting of funds).
In equilibrium, the proportional allocation to active management chosen by each investor is
equal to the aggregate ratio S/W. The equilibrium is partial in several respects. The benchmark
portfolio’s returns are assumed to be exogenously given, and thus unaffected by the actions of
investors and fund managers. In addition, the managers’ potential outperformance comes at the
expense of other investors whose decisions are not modeled here.6 We also isolate an investor’s
active-versus-passive allocation decision from his labor income, real estate, nationality, and any
state variables that are typically associated with hedging demands. While such variables may well
be relevant forthe investor’s consumption/investment decision and even his overall asset allocation
decision, they seem unlikely to have ﬁrst-order effects on deciding how to split ﬁnancial wealth
6The latter investors are required by the fact that alphas (before costs) must aggregate to zero across all investors
(see, for example, Sharpe (1991) and Fama and French (2010)). In the absence of such other investors, one could not
expect active managers to earn positive alphas. These other investors might trade for exogenous “liquidity” reasons,
for example, or they couldengage in their own active (non-benchmark)investing withoutemployingtheM managers.
They could also be “misinformed” (Fama and French, 2007) or “irrational” in that they might make systematic mis-
takes in evaluating the distributionsof future payoffs. Such investors might retain a signiﬁcant fraction of wealth even
in the longrun, and they can affect asset prices even if theirwealth is very small (Kogan, Ross, Wang, and Westerﬁeld,
2006). Good candidates for such investors are individuals who invest in ﬁnancial markets directly. For example, the
proportion of U.S. equity held directly by individuals is substantial: in 1980–2007, this proportion ranged from 22%
in 2007 to 48% in 1980 (French, 2008).
9between active and passive funds. In particular, it is not clear why any state variables should be
related to the non-benchmark risk in active management, represented by u in (2).
We assume that all funds have a beta of one: β = ιM, where β is deﬁned in equation (2).7
Combined with equations (2) and (10), this assumption gives
rj = rP + δ
0
j (α + u). (11)
The benchmark return rp is then present in the investor’s portfolio return for any choice of δj. In
other words, with this unit-beta assumption, the allocation decision hinges on the funds’ active
contributions, α + u, but not on their benchmark exposures.
B. Equilibrium Under Risk Neutrality
Before turning to the mean-varianceobjective in (9), we ﬁrst analyze the risk-neutral setting in




This simpler setting allows a more transparent analysis of the effects of competition that also
arise in the mean-variance setting, as shown later in Section IV. The following proposition gives
the equilibrium values of the key quantities under three alternative speciﬁcations of the nature of
competition between managers and investors.
PROPOSITION1. Inequilibriumforinvestors and managerswhen ˜ a > 0, wehave E(αi|D) =
˜ α and fi = f for all funds i receiving positive investment. With perfect competition among both
managers and investors (M → ∞, N → ∞),
f = 0 (13)







With perfect competition among managers but only a single investor (M → ∞, N = 1),











7This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence for active equity mutual funds. Based on monthly data
for the 1/1962–9/2006period, the aggregate portfolio of U.S. actively managed mutual funds has a beta of 0.99 with
respect to the value-weighted market index.












When ˜ a ≤ 0, then S/W = 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
With competing managers, the equilibrium fee is f = 0. If the fee were instead equal to some
positive value, any fund manager setting an inﬁnitesimally lower fee would attract all investment
from other funds to that lower-fee fund. Note that f is the portion of a manager’s fee that he sets
while taking into account its effect on his fund’s size. In that sense it is analogous to the part
of the price that a supplier sets while taking into account its effect on his sales. Under perfect
competition, suppliers and managers are price takers, and such discretionary quantities vanish.
That doesn’t mean that that suppliers set a zero price or that managers work for nothing. Any
competitiveproportionalfee, which isn’t under a manager’sdiscretion, is simply part of a. In other
words, a is a rate of return net of proportional costs of producing that return, where the latter costs
(not under the manager’s discretion) include competitive compensation to the manager and other
inputs to producing alpha.
Withcompetinginvestors, theequilibriumexpected alphais ˜ α = 0. Each investorin thatsetting
sees his own investment as having no effect on S/W, and thus no effect on alphas. Investors
impose a negative externality on each other: they dilute each other’s returns by investing to the
point where the expected alpha on all active funds is zero. If the expected alpha were instead
positive, all investors would be dissatisﬁed with their current holding of active funds and would
wish to increase it, thereby raising S/W and lowering alpha.
With no competition among managers or no competition among investors, the industry size is
only half as large as in the fully competitive setting (compare equation (15) with (18) and (21)).
The value in (18) and (21) is also the value that maximizes expected total proﬁt. That is, using











which is maximized at S/W = ˜ a/(2˜ b), the value in (18) and (21). At that value, Π = S(˜ a/2),
equivalent to an expected rate of return of ˜ a/2 on the invested amount S. That expected rate of
11return, ˜ a/2, is earned as ˜ α in (17) by a single investor when facing competing managers. The
same rate of ˜ a/2 is also charged as the fee in (19) by a single manager facing competing investors.
With N = 1, proﬁt is maximized because the single investor fully internalizes the fact that his own
investment determines S/W and, thereby, expected proﬁt. With M = 1, the single manager acts
as a monopolist in setting the fee such that the resulting industry size produces fee revenue that
captures the maximum expected proﬁt.
Competition makes it easier to understand why the active management industry is large. When
both managers and investors compete, the resulting industry size of S/W = ˜ a/˜ b in (15) is twice
as large as the proﬁt-maximizingsize, as noted earlier. This fully competitive industry size, which
is denoted by S/W in Figure 1, produces zero expected proﬁt in (22). Despite generating no
proﬁts for investors or managers, the fully competitive industry can nevertheless provide a positive
externality to asset markets. Suppose the benchmark is “correct” in an asset-pricing context, in
that securities with non-zero alphas with respect to the benchmark are mispriced. Opportunities
to outperform the benchmark then reﬂect mispricing. If no money actively chased mispricing
(S = 0), some mispricing would likely exist. By moving prices toward fair values, the industry
provides a positive externality to the (unmodeled) real side of the economy.
In the maximization in (12), we impose the lower bound of zero on the elements of δj, but we
have not imposed an upper bound. A reasonable alternative is to impose the constraint
δ
0
jιM ≤ 1, (23)
which precludes shorting of the passive benchmark portfolio (cf. (10)). When (23) binds, S/W
in equations (15), (18) or (21) exceeds one, and the constrained equilibrium value of S/W instead
equals one. Also, as in the earlier unconstrained setting, f = 0 with competition among managers,
but then ˜ α = ˜ a−˜ b, apositive valuethat does not depend on whether investors compete. In essence,
the constraint in (23) then prevents investors from increasing the size of the industry to the point at
which all proﬁt is eliminated. In contrast, when there is just a single manager and (23) binds, the
manager earns a fee greater than the value in (19), while competition among investors still delivers
˜ α = 0. The Appendix includes a treatment of the case in which (23) binds.
C. Equilibrium in the Mean-Variance Setting
We now turn to the mean-variance setting in which investors maximize the objective function
in (9). Our primary focus is on the fully competitive case (M → ∞, N → ∞). In Section IV,
we also discuss results under the additional scenarios discussed above, in which either M = 1 or
N = 1. Those results show that the equilibrium values of S/W closely follow the same relative
proportions across the alternative scenarios as in the risk-neutral setting. That is, with either a
12single investor (N = 1, M → ∞) or a single manager (M = 1, N → ∞), S/W is only about half
as large as its fully competitive value. Unlike the fully competitive case, where the equilibrium
can be computed analytically, the two additional cases require numerical solutions. The solution
procedures for those cases are explained in the Appendix.
The explicit analytic solution for S/W in the fully competitive case—the solution to a cubic
equation—is fairly cumbersome. We instead simply present that cubic equation in the following
proposition:
PROPOSITION 2. In equilibrium with perfect competition among both managers and in-
vestors, if ˜ a > 0, then S/W is given by the (unique) real positive solution to the equation





















when the constraint in (23) does not bind, where γ = µP/σ2
P. If investors also face the constraint
in (23) and the solution to (24) exceeds 1, then S/W = 1. If ˜ a ≤ 0, then S/W = 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
When the equilibrium value of S/W lies between 0 and 1, it can be represented in mean-



























using equations (2), (3), (8), and the result that f = 0 in equilibrium. Thus, as M → ∞,
rA = a − b
S
W
+ x , (26)
since the variance of the last term in (25) goes to zero. It follows from (26) that
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13where the resulting mean-variance expression in (30) relies on (27) and (28).




























α depends on S/W, thus requiring the solution to the cubic equation in (24). In the
special case where a and b are known, σ2
α = 0 and the right-hand side of (32) yields the solution
directly, so solving the cubic equation is then unnecessary. As before in the risk-neutral solution
(15), we see in (32) that greater proﬁtability of the ﬁrst dollar invested (higher ˜ a) makes the equi-
librium industry size larger, while more strongly decreasing returns to scale (higher ˜ b) makes the
industry smaller.
The role of uncertainty about a and b in determining industry size can be seen in (32). This
uncertainty enters through uncertainty about α, which enters the denominator in (32) via γσ2
α.
Greater uncertainty about α thus makes the industry smaller. We specify γ (= µP/σ2
P) as 1.92,
which is based on estimates for the market portfolio and the same 1/1962–9/2006 period over
which our fund data are available.8 With this value of γ, the product γσ2
α can exert a nontrivial
effect on industry size when there is substantial uncertainty about a and b, such as one might
possess before updating prior beliefs with data. After such updating, however, the magnitude of
γσ2
α is often small compared to ˜ b, which also appears in the denominator in (32). Thus, posterior
uncertainty about a and b typically does not exert a large effect on the equilibrium S/W.
Uncertainty about the unexpected active return also affects industry size, via γσ2
x in the de-
nominator in (32). We specify the volatility of the aggregate active benchmark-adjusted return
as σx = 0.02, or 2% per year, which is approximately equal to the annualized residual standard
deviation from the regression of the value-weighted average return of all active U.S. equity mutual
funds on the market benchmark in the 1/1962–9/2006 period. With this value of σx, the value of
γσ2
x is often small compared to ˜ b, as is the value of γσ2
α after prior beliefs are updated with data.
As a result, after updating with data, the equilibrium value of S/W is generally well approximated
by (15), which omits the term γ(σ2
x + σ2
α) that appears in (32).
The industry’s expected alpha, ˜ α = E(rA|D), can be obtained by combining equations (27)
8Our data are described in more detail in Section III.B.
14and (32) to give










We see from (33) that ˜ α > 0. In order for a positive allocation to active management to offer
investors a higher Sharpe ratio than the passive benchmark, investors must expect compensation
for the non-diversiﬁable risky component x as well as for uncertainty about α.
III. Prior and Posterior Beliefs
In this section, we discuss the prior and posterior beliefs about the key parameters, a and b, as
well as beliefs about the alpha implied by those parameters. We also describe our data.
A. Prior Beliefs
A common assumption in the literature is that returns to scale in active investing are constant
(b = 0). While we consider such a dogmatic prior belief as well, our focus is on prior beliefs in
which returns are decreasing in scale at an uncertain rate (i.e., b is an unknown positive value). We
show in Section IV that investors who believe a priori that b > 0 make very different investment
decisions than do investors who believe that b = 0, even after observing exactly the same evidence.
To capture decreasing returns to scale, we specify a bivariate normal joint prior distribution for





∼ N (E0,V0)I(b ≥ 0) , (34)
where N(E0,V0) denotes a bivariate normal distribution with mean E0 and covariance matrix V0,



















0 = V ab
0 = 0, for simplicity. We consider a wide range of prior means of b, denoted
by b0. In thissection, wefocuson b0 = 0.1, a valueof particularinterest in thesubsequent analysis.
Given the properties of the truncated normal distribution, this prior mean implies V bb
0 = 0.016 and
a prior standard deviation for b equal to σ0
b = 0.076. The marginal prior distribution for b is plotted
in Panel B of Figure 2—it is the right half of a zero-mean normal distribution truncated below at
zero.
Panel A of Figure 2 plots three different marginal prior distributions for a. All three distribu-
tions are normal. Their means and standard deviations, a0 and σ0
a, are speciﬁed such that investors
15with those prior beliefs would optimally choose a given fraction (S/W)0 before observing the his-
torical data. We consider three values of (S/W)0: 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0. For a given value of (S/W)0,
there generally exist multiplepairs of (a0,σ0
a) for which (S/W)0 is the optimal allocation. To pick
a single pair, we impose the additional constraint that the prior probability of a < 0 is 1%. This
constraint is motivated by the discussion presented earlier in Section II. Recall that a represents
the expected return on the initial fraction of wealth invested in active management. As we argued
in Section II, if no money were invested in active management, some opportunities to outperform
passive benchmarkswould likely exist, so the initial active investment would almost certainly have
a positive expected benchmark-adjusted return. We thus specify priors that admit only a small
(1%) probability of a < 0, as shown in Panel A. In the robustness analysis presented in Section
IV.D, we also consider probabilities of 0.1% and 10%.
B. Data
Investors update their prior beliefs with the histories of active returns {rA,t} and equilibrium
active allocations{(S/W)t}. In theory, these quantities can apply to theactive management indus-
try in its largest sense, encompassing not only mutual fundsbut also other segments of theindustry,
such as deﬁned beneﬁt pension funds. If the data were available, our empirical analysis could take
that broadest perspective. In reality, however, the availability of long series of reliable historical
data limits our analysis to mutual funds, a major segment of the industry. We view mutual fund
data as a reasonable representation of active management as a whole, in terms of both its historical
returns and its share relative to passive investing. It is difﬁcult to observe evidence for or against
such a view, but we suggest that it seems reasonable. An alternative interpretation of our model,
narrower but also reasonable, is simply that it pertains to mutual funds.
For the series of both rA,t and (S/W)t, we use the data compiled by Fama and French (2010).9
For each year t from 1963 through 2006, we set rA,t−1 equal to the return on the aggregate port-
folio of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds, net of the return attributable to the portfolio’s
estimated exposures to the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio. For the market portfolio to
represent a fair benchmark for active funds, we need to take into account the small but nontrivial
cost of holding the market. We do so by subtracting 15 basis points from each annual market re-
turn.10 For each year t, we also construct (S/W)t as the ratio of total assets under management for
9We are grateful to Ken French for providing the data, which end in September 2006. The classiﬁcation of funds
as active versus passive is performed by Fama and French.
10This amount is slightly smaller than the expense ratios of Vanguard’s 500 Index Fund and Total Stock Market
Index Fund (17 and 18 basis points, respectively, as of 2011), which are among the largest and cheapest index funds
available to retail investors. Expense ratios of index funds used to be higher in the funds’ early years. Our assumption
of the same low expense ratio throughout the sample is conservative in that using a higher index fund expense ratio
would make it easier to rationalize a high allocation to active management.
16non-index funds to total assets under management for all funds, both measured at the beginning of
year t. As shown in Table 1, (S/W)t equals 1.00 from 1962 through 1976, and then it gradually
declines to 0.87 at the end of 2005. The timing is such that rA,t is the return following investors’
equilibrium allocation (S/W)t.
C. Posterior Beliefs
To update their beliefs about a and b, investors conduct inference about the coefﬁcients in a
time-series regression of returns on the equilibrium allocations. At the end of the sample of T
years, the available data in D consist of yT = [rA,1...rA,T]0 and zT = [(S/W)1 ...(S/W)T]0.
In a regression of yT on −zT and a constant, the intercept is a and the slope is b (see equation
(26)). Recall that investors’ prior beliefs for a and b are given by the bivariate truncated normal
distribution in equation (34), whose non-truncated moments are E0 and V0. Those moments are



























where ZT = [ ιT −zT ]. The posterior distribution of a and b is bivariate truncated normal as
in equation (34), except that E0 and V0 are replaced by E and V from equations (36) and (37).11
Having the updated momentsE and V of thenon-truncated bivariatenormal distribution,we apply
the relations in Muthen (1991) to obtain the updated moments of the truncated bivariate normal
distribution, deﬁned in equations (5) and (6).12
Panels C and D of Figure2 show theposterior distributionsfor a and b, respectively. Compared
to the priors, the posteriors are shifted to the left, indicating a downward revision in beliefs about
a and b. For example, for the middle prior (solid line), the posterior mean for a is 0.06, which is
below the prior mean of 0.09, and the posterior mean for b is 0.07, below the prior mean of 0.1.
Interestingly, while the posteriors are naturally tighter than the priors, they remain quite disperse.
For example, for the middle prior, the values of zero and 0.15 are both well within the support of
the posterior distributions of both a and b. Investors clearly remain substantially uncertain about a
and b even after observing 44 years of data.
11In deriving the posterior of a and b from the regression of yT on −zT, it is useful to note that (S/W)T is a
deterministic function of its initial value and returns prior to time T, so there is no randomness in S/W beyond what
is in past returns. The likelihood function is obtained simply by transforming the density of {xs; s = 1,...,T} to
the density of {rA,s; s = 1,...,T}, where the Jacobian of that transformation equals 1. As a result, the likelihood
function is identical to what would arise if the observations of S/W were treated as nonstochastic.
12Earlier results for such moments appear in Rosenbaum (1961), but the published article contains some errors in
signs that we veriﬁed throughsimulation.
17To understandwhy theposterioruncertaintyabout a and b isso large, it helpsto examineFigure
3. The ﬁgure plots the observed active fund returns rA,t against the observed active allocations
(S/W)t for the full 44-year sample. The sample estimates of a and b can be obtained by ﬁtting a
line through the scatterplot in Figure 3 and measuring the line’s intercept (= a) and slope (= −b).
It is immediately clear from Figure 3 that these estimates are very imprecise because more than
half the observations are bunched on top of each other at the right-hand-side edge of the plot
(speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst 27 observations in our 44-year sample have (S/W)t > 0.99). Indeed, the
conﬁdence intervals for the OLS sample estimates of a and b are very wide (the standard errors of
both estimates exceed 0.09, whereas the estimates themselves are both within 0.03 of zero). Since
the sample does not contain much information about a and b, the posterior distributions in Figure
2 are only modestly tighter than the priors.
The investor’s beliefs about a and b, which are the key parameters in our model, translate into
beliefs about α, a more familiar quantity. Recall that α = a − b(S/W) in the fully competitive
setting. Figure 4 plots the prior and posterior distributions for the equilibrium α, which is α
evaluated at the equilibrium value of S/W. The priors for α, shown in Panel A, are computed
from the priors of a and b and the same prior equilibrium values of (S/W)0 as in Figure 2: 0.6,
0.8, and 1.0. The posteriors for α, shown in Panel B, are computed from the posteriors of a and b
and the values of S/W that obtain in equilibrium based on those posterior beliefs.
Figure 4 shows that all three priors are rather noninformativeabout α, in that most of the prob-
ability mass is on values between roughly -20% and 20% per year. The prior standard deviations
range from 5.3% to 9.1% per year across the three priors. In contrast, the posteriors for α are much
tighter: all three posterior standard deviations are just below 0.5% per year. The large difference
between Panels A and B indicates that our 44-year sample contains a lot of information about the
equilibrium α. Another interesting comparison is that between the tight posteriors of α in Figure 4
and the relatively disperse posteriors of a and b in Figure 2. The large difference is due to the fact
that a and b exhibit a very high posterior correlation (about 99%). In other words, after observing
the full sample, investors remain quite uncertain about the values of a and b, but they are quite
certain that if a is high then b is high as well. They are also quite certain that the equilibrium α
is close to zero. The posterior means of the equilibrium α are only about 7 basis points per year
for all three priors, indicating that investors do not require much compensation for bearing the risk
associated with active investing (see equation (33)).
As a point of comparison, we also consider a dogmaticprior belief that returnsto scale arecon-
stant (b = 0). Under that prior, only the beliefs about a are updated, following the standard result
for updating the mean of a normal distribution. Given the history of returns, yT = [rA,1 ...rA,T]0
18with sample average ¯ rA,T, the posterior moments of a (and α) are given by



































IV. Is the Industry’s Size Puzzling Given Its Track Record?
Inthissection, weuse ourmodeltoask whetherit ispuzzlingthattheactivemanagementindus-
try remains large, given its unﬂattering historical performance. Speciﬁcally, we explore properties
of prior beliefs that would lead the rational investors in our model to choose a large allocation to
active management, once they update their beliefs with the historical data. As discussed earlier,
our model is not limited to mutual funds, but our empirical analysis treats that segment as repre-
sentative of active management’s relative size and track record, given the availability of mutual
fund data. We thus take the most recent value of the S/W series described earlier, 0.87, as the
empirical benchmark against which to compare equilibrium values of S/W implied by the model.
A. Importance of Decreasing Returns to Scale
Key to our analysis is the prior belief about b, the degree of decreasing returns to scale. The
prior for b is fully determined by the prior mean b0, as explained in Section III. Figure 5 plots the
equilibrium allocation S/W for a wide range of values of b0. For each value of b0, the prior for
the other unknown parameter, a, is speciﬁed such that prob(a < 0) = 0.01 and the equilibrium
S/W based on just the prior beliefs about a and b is equal to 0.8 in the fully competitive setting
(M → ∞,N → ∞).13 The values of S/W plotted in the ﬁgure are computed after updating
beliefs about a and b with the histories of rA,t and (S/W)t used in the previous section.
Our main result appears as the solid line in Figure 5, which plots the equilibrium S/W in
the fully competitive setting. We see that the current size of the active management industry is
consistent with beliefs that the industry faces decreasing returns to scale. For b0 ≥ 0.1 or so, the
equilibrium S/W essentially matches the empirical benchmark value of 0.87. Investors are willing
to invest that much despite poor past performance because past underperformance does not imply
future underperformance. Under decreasing returns to scale, the expected return in any given
period is conditional on the investment level S/W in that period. As discussed in the previous
section, historical returns were earned at various levels of S/W all higher than 0.87, allowing
investors to believe that performance going forward will be positive at S/W = 0.87.
13Our results are robust to alternative prior speciﬁcations, as discussed later in Section IV.D.
19With decreasing returns, investors’ allocation to active management after observing poor per-
formance can actually be higher than what they would allocate without seeing that performance.
For b0 ≥ 0.05 or so, investors who allocate 80% to active management before seeing the data allo-
cate a higher fraction after seeing the data, even though the data include a negative return history.
One reason is resolution of uncertainty about alpha. Recall that the posterior uncertainty about the
equilibrium alpha is substantially lower than the prior uncertainty (Figure 4), and that this uncer-
tainty (σ2
α) appears in the denominator of S/W in (32). Another reason is that investors update
their beliefs using not only the return history but also the history of (S/W)t. A value of b0 = 0.1
means that, before seeing the data, investors expect that reducing S/W by 0.1 would raise alpha
by 1%. Recall from Figure 2 that investors’ posterior beliefs about b are shifted to the left relative
to the prior. Although the posterior of a also shifts closer to zero, that shift is more than offset by
the reductions in σ2
α and the mean of b, producing a higher ratio in (32).
The story is very different if investors believe that b = 0, i.e., that returns to scale are constant.
For example, if such investors have the same prior for a as in the case where b0 = 0.1, they invest
nothing in active management after updating with thesame historical data.14 Wealso see that S/W
in Figure 5 takes substantially lower values as the prior mean of b moves closer to zero.
B. Decreasing Returns vs Optimism
The b = 0 setting also underscores the point that our story hinges on decreasing returns to
scale (b > 0), as opposed to investor optimism about active management. Panel A of Figure 6
displays percentiles of the prior for α in the b = 0 speciﬁcation described above. This prior is
the same as the distribution for a displayed as the solid line in Panel A of Figure 2. With b = 0,
this is the prior for α at all levels of S/W. The corresponding prior for α in the b > 0 setting,
with b0 = 0.1, is displayed in Panel B of Figure 6. In the latter setting, the prior for α depends
on S/W. For S/W = 0, the prior for α is the same as in the b = 0 case in Panel A, but as S/W
increases, all of the percentiles decline. In other words, at all positive levels of S/W, the prior for
α is more optimistic when b = 0 than when b > 0. Despite the higher prior optimism about α, the
equilibrium value of S/W equals zero after the b = 0 prior is updated with the data. In contrast,
when the same data are used to update the less optimistic b > 0 prior, the resulting equilibrium
S/W matches the empirical benchmark of 0.87. This striking difference is due to the fact that the
b = 0 and b > 0 priors are updated very differently, as explained earlier in Section III.
C. Importance of Competition
14When b = 0, the cubic equation in (24) simpliﬁes to a linear equation. In this case, σ2
α does not depend on S/W,
so the equilibrium S/W is given directly by the ﬁrst equality in (31). The active-management allocation problem is
then essentially equivalent to the setting in Treynor and Black (1973), but with the addition of parameter uncertainty.
20Competition plays an important role in determining the industry’s size. Figure 5 also displays
the equilibrium S/W when there is no competition among investors or no competition among
managers. In analyzing these additional cases, we assume investors have the same priors about
a and b as in the fully competitive case, and they update with the same data. We see from the
dashed linethat solving the active-management allocation problemfrom theperspective of a single
representative investor understates industry size by about half, even though managers compete
with each other (M → ∞, N = 1). The dotted line shows that the industry’s size is similarly
understated by half if competitive investors allocate to an industry that acts as a monopolist (M =
1, N → ∞). Thus, we see that the effects of competition, obtained numerically in this mean-
variance setting, follow closely the closed-form results obtained in the risk-neutral setting.
D. Robustness
Ourresultsarequiterobustto alternativespeciﬁcations. Recall thatforagivenpriordistribution
of b, the prior for a is speciﬁed such that prob(a < 0) = 0.01 and S/W equals 0.8 based on the
prior for a and b. We now consider alternative values for these prior criteria. Speciﬁcally, we allow
the prior value of S/W to be 1.0 or 0.6, and we allow prob(a < 0) to be 0.1 or 0.001. Figure 7
displays theequilibriumS/W in thefully competitivesetting after updating thesealternativepriors
with the historical data. Each panel reports results under all three prior values of S/W. Panel B
maintains the original speciﬁcation of prob(a < 0) = 0.01; in Panel A that probability is ten times
smaller, while in Panel C it is ten times larger.
While there are some differencesacross Panels A through C of Figure 7, all of the results paint
the same basic picture as the original result (solid line in Figure 5). That is, as b0 increases, the
equilibrium level of S/W rises sharply to a level approximately equal to the empirical benchmark.
It doesn’t rise quite that high in Panel C, which assigns a non-trivial 10% probability to even the
ﬁrst dollar of active management being unproﬁtable, but in general the results are robust to the
various alternative speciﬁcations of the prior for a.
Panel D of Figure 7 displays results in the hypothetical scenario in which the value of b is
known a priori. The prior for a is speciﬁed using the same criteria as in the baseline case in Panel
B. Panel D shows that the empirical benchmark level of S/W is reached when b is known to be
about 0.07, whereas reaching the same benchmark with unknown b requires a prior mean for b of
about 0.1 (Figure 5). Removing uncertainty about b thus makes it easier to explain the empirical
value of S/W with our decreasing-returns story, in that a known degree of decreasing returns can
be weaker than what must be expected a priori when b is unknown.
Another result of knowing b is that the prior for a becomes less important. This result is
21demonstrated by the similarity of the three lines representing different prior S/W values in Panel
D. It also follows from the plots (not shown) based on the other two values of prob(a < 0), which
are virtually indistinguishable from Panel D. The reason behind this result is that when b is known,
the historical data become more informative about the single remaining unknown parameter, a.
V. Future Size of the Active Management Industry
While the previous section focuses on the present size of the active management industry, this
section looks into the future. In Section V.A, we conduct simulations to calculate the expected
future industry size after observing various potential track records. In Section V.B, we use the
same simulations to investigate the speed of learning about returnsto scale. To preview our results,
we ﬁnd that the industry is likely to remain large even if it continues to underperform. We also
ﬁnd that learning about a and b is slow, highlighting the rationale for treating these quantities as
uncertain.
A. Expected Future Industry Size
In this subsection, we assess the expected future size of the active management industry con-
ditional on a summary measure of the industry’s future track record. We assume investors enter
the future with beliefs about a and b consistent with the industry’s current size. We then compute
the expected future values of the equilibrium S/W for different values of the t-statistic of the in-
dustry’s future estimated alpha. We ﬁnd that S/W is likely to remain large for a long period of
time, even if the industry’s future alpha turns out to be signiﬁcantly negative as measured by the
t-statistic.
We simulate 300,000 samples of futurereturnson active funds. To simulate a given sample, we
ﬁrst draw a and b randomly from their joint posterior distribution at the end of our 44-year sample.
We pick the baseline posterior distribution whose marginals are plotted by the solid lines in Panels
C and D of Figure 2. Recall that this posterior is obtained from the prior for which b0 = 0.1,
the prior probability of a < 0 is 1%, and the prior equilibrium S/W is 0.8; the corresponding
posterior equilibrium S/W of 0.867 approximately matches the observed value (see Figure 5).
In the second step, we draw the random values of xt ∼ N(0,σ2
x) for t = 1,...,20 years. We
construct the ﬁrst future benchmark-adjusted active return as rA,1 = a − b(0.867) + x1, following
equation (26). Based on this return, we update the beliefs about a and b, following equations (36)
and (37). Wethen solve for thenew equilibriumallocation (S/W)2 based on those updated beliefs,
using Proposition 2. Next, we construct rA,2 = a−b(S/W)2+x2 and repeat the above procedure,
building up the time series of rA,t and (S/W)t for t = 1,...,20. Note that (S/W)t affects rA,t,
which in turn affects (S/W)t+1, etc. For every t, we compute an estimate of the industry’s alpha,
22or ˆ α, as the sample average of {rA,1,...,rA,t}, and we calculate the t-statistic ˆ α
√
t/σx. Finally,
we compute the expected (S/W)t conditional on a given value t0 of the t-statistic as the average
value of (S/W)t across all simulated samples producing t-statistics within a small neighborhood
of t0. The results are plotted in Panel A of Figure 8.
Panel A of Figure8 plotsthe expected futurevalues of (S/W)t, or E(S/W), conditional on the
futuret-statisticsof -2,0, and 2. Conditional on thet-statisticofzero, E(S/W) isroughly constant,
declining from the current value of 86.7% to 86.2% after 20 years. The slight decline reﬂects the
mild disappointment of investors who expect to earn a slightly positive ˆ α (of about 7 basis points
per year, as noted in the description of Figure 4) but end up earning ˆ α = 0. Conditional on the t-
statistic of-2, E(S/W) declines over time. Not surprisingly,if theindustry’sperformanceturnsout
to be worse than expected, the industry is expected to shrink to the beneﬁt of passive investments.
More interesting, E(S/W) remains substantial for long periods of time—it declines from 86.7%
to 72.5% after 10 years, and to 63.4% after 20 years. That is, the industry is expected to remain
large even if it continues to signiﬁcantly underperformits benchmark. This striking result is due to
decreasing returns to scale. Investors observing underperformance reduce their active allocation,
but not as much as they would under constant returns to scale because they understand that when
they allocate less to active management, their future active returns will be higher. (Speciﬁcally,
investors reduce S/W until α reaches its positive equilibrium level in equation (33).)
Panel A also shows that conditional on the t-statistic of two, E(S/W) rises to 92.2% after 20
years. If theindustry performsbetter than expected, it grows at the expense of passive investments,
but its growth is restrained by decreasing returns to scale: investors know that when they allocate
more to active management, their future returnswill be lower. Due to this key mechanism, S/W is
expected to vary slowly over time regardless of performance. Overall, Panel A of Figure 8 shows
that the active management industry is likely to remain large for many years.
A very different picture emerges if investors believe a priori that returns to scale are constant
(b = 0). In that case, there is no need to simulate because the t-statistic of ˆ α is a sufﬁcient
statistic for S/W: a given future t-statistic implies a unique future value of S/W. To produce a
fair comparison with the b > 0 case discussed above, we choose the distribution of a such that
investors with the b = 0 prior perceive the same mean and variance of α as in the b > 0 case.
Speciﬁcally, since b = 0 implies a = α, we assume that the distribution of a is normal with the
same mean and variance as the posterior distribution of α obtained under the b > 0 prior (see Panel
B of Figure 4). As a result, investors initially choose the same S/W (of 86.7%) in both cases (see
equation (31)). The resulting future values of S/W are plotted in Panel B of Figure 8.
Panel B of Figure8 shows that under constant returns to scale, the industry’s size is much more
23sensitive to performance. Conditional on the t-statistic of zero, S/W drops from 86.7% to 45.6%
after 20 years. The reason behind the drop is the same as in the b > 0 case, but the magnitude
is much larger. When b = 0, the response of S/W to performance is no longer cushioned by
decreasing returns to scale in that a reduction in S/W no longer implies a higher expected future
return. The results are even more dramatic when we condition on non-zero t-statistics. For any
t-statistic greater than 0.15, S/W jumps to one after the very ﬁrst year. For any t-statistic below
-0.74, we obtain the other corner solution, S/W = 0, after just one year of underperformance.
These implications appear less plausible than those obtained under decreasing returns to scale.
In simulating the future, we apply our model’s equilibriumin multiplesuccessive years. As ex-
plained earlier, the active return rA in each year depends on the equilibrium active allocation S/W
chosen in the previous year. In that sense, our model delivers a year-by-year dependence between
rA and S/W, generally implying that an unexpectedly high rA in a given year causes a higher
S/W going into the next year. In principle, one could also look for this dependence in the year-by-
year historical data in Table 1, but we do not believe such an exercise would be very informative.
Indexing was novel when it emerged on the investment landscape during the 1970’s. Understand-
ing subsequent year-by-year ﬂuctuations in its share relative to active management must surely
have much to do with the dissemination and adoption of ﬁnancial innovation, which we cannot
hope to capture in our simple model. The strength and duration of the innovation-related effects
in the historical year-by-year variation of S/W are difﬁcult to assess, and we think a conserva-
tive approach here is best. That is, we simply assume that indexing, by now, has evolved to a
fairly matureand familiaralternative, enough so that it is reasonable to entertain current and future
active-versus-passive decisions as being dependent on track records.
B. Learning About Returns to Scale
The values of a and b are unknown to investors. How fast can investors learn about a and b by
observing realized returns and active allocations? To answer this question, we rely on the 300,000
simulated samples described in the previous subsection.
As investors learn, their posterior standard deviations of a and b decline over time. The rate of
decline in these standard deviations depends on the true values of a and b. We draw these values
from their joint posterior distribution, as described earlier. The probability distribution of a and b
thus gives rise to distributions of the posterior standard deviations of a and b. Panels A and B of
Figure 9 show the evolution of these distributions over time. Both panels plot selected percentiles
of the distribution of the respective standard deviation across the 300,000 simulated samples.
Panels A and B of Figure 9 show that learning about a and b is typically slow. For the median
24sample, the posterior standard deviations decline only modestly over the 20-year period: from
0.030 to 0.026 fora, and from0.031 to 0.028 forb. Investorsthus typicallyremain highly uncertain
about a and b even after 20 additional years of learning (on top of the 44 years in our sample). This
result underscores the importance of incorporating uncertainty about a and b in assessing the size
of the active management industry.
Why is learning about a and b slow? The reason is theendogeneity in the way investors learn—
what they learn affects how much they invest, and how much they invest affects what they learn.
As explained in Section V.A, ﬂuctuations in S/W are muted by decreasing returns to scale. The
resulting stability of S/W hamperslearning about a and b. To see why,recall that a and b represent
the intercept and slope from the regression of rA,t on −(S/W)t. If the right-hand side variable in
the regression does not ﬂuctuate much, learning about the intercept and slope is slow. At the
extreme, if S/W stops ﬂuctuating, learning about a and b stops as well. In that case, investors
would eventually learn the true value of α at the prevailing level of S/W, but they would never
learn a and b, so they would forever remain uncertain about α at any other level of S/W.
The extreme case in which S/W stops ﬂuctuating also helps illustrate the link between slow
learning and competition among investors. The aggregate active allocation S/W is determined in
equilibrium by competing investors who cannot coordinate their investment decisions. If investors
could instead coordinate, they might well ﬁnd it useful to continue varying S/W so as to continue
learningabout a and b. In amultiperiodsetting, such investorswould tradeoffnear-termoptimality
of their current allocation against thepotential futurevalueof additional learning by experimenting
with different allocations. The additional learning could be valuable, for example, if investors
could experience a future preference shock that would make their previous allocation suboptimal.
With learning about a and b shut down, investors are uncertain about α at any allocation other
than the current one. The prospect of wanting to change their allocation in the future creates an
incentive for additional learning about a and b.
The speed of learning about a and b can be faster or slower than in the median case discussed
above, depending on the path of S/W. For example, the 95th percentile of the posterior standard
deviation of a after 20 years is 0.029, which is only slightly smaller than the initial value of 0.030.
For these simulated samples, in which S/W ﬂuctuates the least, hardly any learning takes place. In
contrast, the 5th percentile of the same distribution is only 0.018, indicating much faster learning
for samples in which S/W ﬂuctuates more. This interesting path dependence of the speed of
learning is a direct consequence of decreasing returns to scale.15
15As an aside, Panels A and B show that for a small subset of simulated samples, the posterior standard deviations
exceed the prior ones in the ﬁrst few years. This result is due to truncation in the prior for b (b ≥ 0). The standard
deviationofanyleft-truncatednormal distributionisincreasinginthemean ofthesame distribution. Therefore, sample
25In contrast to the fascinating learning process under decreasing returns to scale, learning under
constant returns to scale is straightforward (see equations (38) and (39)). With b = 0, the value of
a (= α) is simply the unconditional mean return. The posterior standard deviation of a, plotted in
Panel C of Figure 9, declines at the usual
√
t rate, regardless of the particular sample realization.
Investors learn differently under decreasing returns to scale because the level and variation in
(S/W)t affect learning when b > 0 but not when b = 0. To summarize, learning about decreasing
returns to scale is path-dependent and generally slow, leaving investors highly uncertain about a
and b even after observing long histories of returns and active allocations.
VI. Relation to Berk and Green (2004)
A central feature of our model is that active managers face decreasing returns to scale in their
abilities to generate alpha. In this respect our approach follows the seminal work of Berk and
Green (2004), but there are important differences. First, Berk and Green (hereafter BG) assume
that decreasing returns apply at the level of individual funds, whereas we assume they apply to the
activemanagementindustryasawhole. That is, weassume anindividualfund’salphaisdecreasing
in the total amount invested by all active funds.16 It seems reasonable that even a small fund ﬁnds
it more difﬁcult to identify proﬁtable investment opportunities as the overall amount of actively-
invested capital grows and thereby moves prices to eliminate such opportunities.17 Assuming
decreasing returns at the individual fund level seems plausible as well, though it encounters the
question of what happens if multiple funds merge or additional managers are hired. Presumably,
in the absence of aggregate effects, such mergers or hires would simply keep increasing the fund
size at which decreasing returns take their bite.
A second difference in our treatment of decreasing returns to scale is that we do not assume
that investors know thedegreeto which alphadropsas the amount of activemanagement increases.
In our parameterization of decreasing returns in (4), the values of both a and b are unknown. In
contrast, the model in BG corresponds to a setting in which a is unknown but b is known.18 As
evidence that raises the posterior mean also pushes up the posterior standard deviation. This force may be stronger or
weaker than the offsettingeffect of learning, which always pulls the posterior standard deviationdown.
16It is easy to show that our assumption of decreasing returns to scale at the aggregate level also implies decreasing
returns to scale at the individual fund level. However, this implication weakens as the number of funds grows larger.
Empirical evidence on returns to scale at the fund level for mutual funds is provided by Chen, Hong, Huang, and
Kubik (2004), Pollet and Wilson (2008), and Reuter and Zitzewitz (2011). Related evidence for hedge funds, at the
fund level as well as aggregate level, is provided by Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008).
17A similar perspective is adopted by Glode and Green (2011) who argue that fund returns can be decreasing in
the size of a sector or trading strategy, as well as in the size of the fund itself. Glode and Green develop a model of
informationspillovers that can rationalize performance persistence in hedge funds.
18BG denote the quantity corresponding to our “b” as “a” in their quadratic parameterization, and they view this
quantity as known. Their “α” corresponds to our “a”—they use “α” to denote the expected return gross of fees and
costs, whereas we use “α” to denote the expected benchmark-adjusted return received by investors (see equation (2)).
26discussed earlier, when both a and b in (4) are unknown, investors face an interesting learning
problem in which learning about those parameters is generally slow.
Another difference from BG is that their investors face ˜ α = 0, whereas ours perceive ˜ α >
0. Our investors maximize (9). BG do not solve the investors’ optimization problem explicitly;
instead, they ﬁx ˜ α = 0 by invoking the assumption that non-benchmark risk can be completely
diversiﬁed away across many funds. BG arguethat if a largenumber of fundswere to have positive
alphas, one could combine them in a portfolio with a positive alpha and zero non-benchmark risk;
˜ α = 0 is thus a necessary condition for equilibrium. Recall from Proposition 1 that our model also
implies ˜ α = 0 in the special case of perfect competition with risk-neutral investors. If investors are
risk-averse, then ˜ α > 0 because investors require compensation for both non-diversiﬁablerisk (σx)
and uncertainty about α (σα), as shown in equation (33). However, ˜ α in the competitive setting is
not necessarily large, especially if learning proceeds to the point where σα is small. For example,
the posterior mean of α in our Figure 4 is only 7 basis points per annum, as noted earlier. Thus,
even though our modeling of the determinants of equilibrium alpha is rather different from that of
BG, their zero-alpha condition is not at sharp odds with our model in practical terms.19
VII. Conclusion
It seems puzzling that active management remains popular despite its poor track record. We
propose a potential resolution to this puzzle. Using a model with competing investors and fund
managers, we ﬁnd that the large observed size of the active management industry can be rational-
ized if investors believe that active managers face decreasing returns to scale. If investors instead
believed that returns to scale were constant, they would allocate nothing to active management
today, even if they were initially more optimistic about active managers’ abilities.
Under decreasing returns to scale, investors adjust their allocation in response to performance
to achieve the desired expected return going forward. After a period of underperformance, the
proportional allocation to active management should be smaller than it was at the beginning of the
period, but it should also remain substantial. Both predictions are consistent with the empirical
evidence for active mutual funds, which have underperformed passive benchmarks over the past
four decades: passive investing has grown dramatically since its humble beginnings in the 1970s,
but active investing remains more popular to this day. We also show that the active management
industry is likely to remain large for many more years, even if it continues to perform poorly.
Investors in our model face endogeneity that limits their learning—what they learn affects how
much they allocate to active management, and what they allocate affects how much they learn.
19A closely related statement is that in our model, past performance predicts future performance, but only slightly.
27Due to this endogeneity, the equilibrium allocation tends to vary little over time, resulting in slow
learning about the degree of returns to scale in active management. Initial beliefs about returns to
scale thus affect the investors’ active allocations for a long time.
Given the inherent difﬁculty in estimating returns to scale, further empirical work seems war-
ranted. Besides estimating returns to scale at the aggregate level, one could also try to measure
them for varioussegments of the active management industry. Futureresearch can also exploread-
ditional aspects of learning about the parameters governing returns to scale. Those parameters are
held constant in our model, for simplicity, but they could plausibly vary due to exogenous shocks,
such as shocks to market liquidity. In such a setting, parameter uncertainty would get refreshed
periodically, further slowing the learning process. Continuing research into decreasing returns to
scale in active management is likely to yield non-decreasing returns.
28Appendix
This appendix provides details of the equilibria in the various settings considered. After brief
preliminaries, we ﬁrst analyze the risk-neutral setting and then turn to the mean-variance setting.
In both settingswe consider threecases: perfectcompetition among managersand investors(M →
∞, N → ∞), perfectly competitive managers facing a single investor (M → ∞, N = 1), and
perfectly competitive investors facing a single manager (M = 1, N → ∞).
Combining equations (8) and (11) gives investor j’s excess portfolio return as





ιM − f + u) , (A1)
where f is the M × 1 vector of fund fees. Denote ωj = δ0
jιM. We then obtain
E(rj|D) = µP +
￿
































When ˜ a ≤ 0, investors invest nothing in active management (recall that the elements of δj must
be non-negative). In that case, a positive investment in active management would produce a lower
expected return and higher variance than an all-benchmark investment; therefore, S/W = 0 in
equilibrium. Since active management does exist, we assume hereafter that ˜ a > 0.
When managers are perfectly competitive (M → ∞), it is clear that f must be the zero vector
in equilibrium. Any manager charging a positive fee would be offering investors a lower expected
return than any zero-fee competitors. In a risk-neutral setting, it follows immediately that such a
manager wouldreceiveno investment. Ina mean-variancesetting, thepresenceof many competing
managers allows investors to hold well-diversiﬁed portfolios, with the property that δ0
jδj → 0, so
the positive-feemanager offersno reduction in overall variance. Thus, compared to his many zero-
fee competitors, a positive-fee manager would simply be offering a lower expected return with no
reduction in variance, and he would again receive no investment.
A. Risk-Neutral Setting
M → ∞ and N → ∞.
When investorsareperfectlycompetitive(N → ∞), investorj viewsthechoiceofωj ashaving
no effect on S/W. Since f is zero with perfectly competitive managers, it follows from (A2) that
each risk-neutral investor chooses ωj to maximize the expected return,
E(rj|D) = µP +
￿





29If (23) does not bind, investor j’s ﬁrst order condition in maximizing (A4) is (15), which then
delivers (14), using (8) and fi = 0. If (23) binds, then every investor desires ωj > 1 and S/W = 1.
In that case, ˜ α = ˜ a −˜ b is positive.
M → ∞ and N = 1.
When N = 1, the single investor realizes that ωj = S/W and replaces (A4) with
E(rj|D) = µP +
￿






If (23) does not bind, the equilibrium value of S/W that maximizes expected return is given by
(18). If (23) binds, then, as in the previous case, S/W = 1 and ˜ α = ˜ a −˜ b.
M = 1 and N → ∞.
Here the monopolistic manager sets the rate f to maximize fee revenue fS. For a given f, we
see from (A2) that each investor j chooses ωj to maximize
E(rj|D) = µP +
￿






giving the ﬁrst-order condition
S = W





f(˜ a − f)
˜ b
. (A8)
Knowing (A8), the manager sets the maximizing value f = ˜ a/2, as given in (19). Substituting that
value into (A7) implies S/W = ˜ a/(2˜ b), as given in (21). Substituting those values for f and S/W
into (8) gives (20). If ˜ a/(2˜ b) > 1, then satisfying (23) requiresS/W = 1 and, therefore, f = ˜ a−˜ b.
B. Mean-Variance Setting
M → ∞ and N → ∞.
Since in this setting we can set f and δ0


































30When the constraint in (23) does not bind, the ﬁrst-order condition for the maximization in (A9) is
0 =
￿























Dividing through by σ2
P, recalling γ = µP/σ2
P, and recognizing that ωj = S/W in equilibrium
gives the cubic equation in (24). It can be veriﬁed that this equation has one positive real solution
for S/W. If that solution exceeds 1, the constraint in (23) binds, and then S/W = 1.
M → ∞ and N = 1.
As in the above case, we can set f and δ0
jδj to zero. As in the earlier risk-neutral setting, a
single investor solving (A9) realizes that ωj = S/W. The expected return is then given by (A5),
























Equilibrium is computed by using (A5) and (A12) to solve (A9) numerically, subject to the con-
straint S/W ≤ 1.
M = 1 and N → ∞.
As in the risk-neutral setting, the expected return is given by (A6). In this single-manager
case, we consider the aggregate portfolio of active funds as if it were managed by a monopolist,
so σ￿ = 0 for this diversiﬁed portfolio. The investor’s return variance is then given by (A10).
Substituting the equilibrium condition ωj = S/W into investor j’s ﬁrst-order condition for the
maximization in (A9) leads to the cubic equation,





















which is the same as (24) but with ˜ a replaced by ˜ a − f. Equilibrium is computed numerically by
ﬁnding the value of f that maximizes f times the solution to (A13) given f.
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34TABLE 1
RETURNS AND RELATIVE SIZE OF ACTIVELY MANAGED FUNDS
Adj. Adj.
Year S/W Ret. Ret. Year S/W Ret. Ret.
1962 1.0000 -16.84 -4.09 1984 0.9962 -11.63 -5.03
1963 1.0000 16.05 -0.97 1985 0.9951 20.43 -2.32
1964 1.0000 11.01 -1.19 1986 0.9946 9.60 0.66
1965 1.0000 14.68 4.71 1987 0.9920 -3.19 0.47
1966 1.0000 -9.89 3.24 1988 0.9910 9.30 -1.37
1967 1.0000 23.65 0.26 1989 0.9865 17.64 -1.60
1968 1.0000 5.60 -2.90 1990 0.9809 -13.91 -0.32
1969 1.0000 -18.99 -2.03 1991 0.9769 28.65 1.71
1970 1.0000 -12.56 -6.20 1992 0.9718 4.53 -0.70
1971 1.0000 13.71 2.44 1993 0.9615 11.29 3.04
1972 1.0000 11.08 -1.81 1994 0.9579 -5.23 -0.58
1973 1.0000 -27.49 -2.54 1995 0.9535 26.82 -2.08
1974 1.0000 -34.12 0.76 1996 0.9391 12.68 -2.60
1975 1.0000 26.89 -3.46 1997 0.9251 19.58 -4.51
1976 1.0000 17.51 -3.29 1998 0.9073 14.05 -2.64
1977 0.9996 -8.13 -0.16 1999 0.8939 20.83 1.09
1978 0.9993 2.94 1.78 2000 0.8945 -13.80 2.74
1979 0.9978 15.88 2.46 2001 0.8883 -18.39 -3.63
1980 0.9977 22.03 0.94 2002 0.8822 -24.09 -2.23
1981 0.9976 -18.26 -0.04 2003 0.8791 29.97 -0.92
1982 0.9977 13.64 4.23 2004 0.8720 10.92 -0.36
1983 0.9969 11.96 -1.28 2005 0.8686 4.72 0.68
NOTE—The table reports the fraction of total U.S. mutual fund assets that are actively managed
(S/W), the percent return on that aggregate active portfolio, and the portfolio’s market-adjusted
return. The adjusted return is equal to the intercept plus the residual in a regression of the active
portfolio’s return on the market return. The value of S/W is for the end of the year during which
the corresponding return occurs.
35FIG.1—Decreasing returns toscaleforthe activemanagementindustry. Thisﬁgureplotsthetheoretical
relation between the expected benchmark-adjusted excess fund return before fees against the relative size of
theactive management industry. Speciﬁcally, it plotsequation(8): α+f = a−b S
W , where α is theexpected
benchmark-adjusted excess fund return earned by investors, f is the proportional fee charged by the fund
manager, and S/W is the aggregate allocation to active management. For b > 0, the industry exhibits
decreasing returns to scale. The values of α, f, and S/W are determined in equilibrium. At S/W = ¯ S/W,
we have α = f = 0.
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FIG. 2—Prior and posterior distributions for a and b. The ﬁgure plots priors and posteriors for a and b
in the function αt = a−b(S/W)t−f, where αt is the expected active benchmark-adjusted return, (S/W)t
is the aggregate allocation to active management, and f is the fee (zero under competition). The prior for b
shown in Panel B has a mean of 0.1. Three priors for a based on that value are shown in Panel A. All three
have the property prob(a < 0) = 0.01 but differ with respect to the “prior S/W”—the S/W under the fully
competitive equilibrium based only on prior beliefs. Panels C and D display the posteriors obtained after
updating with the mutual fund data, covering the 1962–2005 period.








































FIG. 3—Activemanagement’s relativesize (S/W) versus the benchmark-adjusted activereturn. The
ﬁgure plots theannual observationsof thefraction of total U.S. mutual fund assets that are actively managed
(horizontal axis) versus the market-adjusted percent return on that aggregate active portfolio (vertical axis).
The sample period is 1962–2005, and each S/W value is for the beginning of the year during which the
corresponding return occurs.
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FIG. 4—Prior and posterior distributions for alpha. The ﬁgure displays priors (Panel A) and posteriors
(Panel B) of alpha in the fully competitive setting, where αt = a − b(S/W)t, and (S/W)t is the aggregate
allocationto active management. The priors and posteriors of α displayed here are implied by the priors and
posteriors of a and b displayed in Figure 2. The priorfor b has a mean of 0.1; the three priors for a, based on
that value, all have the property prob(a < 0) = 0.01 but differ with respect to the “prior S/W”—the S/W
under the fully competitiveequilibriumbased only on prior beliefs. The posteriorsare obtained by updating
the priors with the mutual fund data, covering the 1962–2005 period.
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FIG. 5—Equilibrium active allocation: effects of competition. For different numbers of funds (M) and
investors (N), the ﬁgure plots the equilibrium aggregate allocation to active management (S/W) based on
updated beliefs that incorporate mutual fund data for the 1962–2005 period. For each value of the prior
mean of b, the prior for a is speciﬁed such that prob(a < 0) = 0.01 and the equilibrium S/W equals 0.8 in
the perfectly competitive case (M → ∞, N → ∞) when based only on the prior distribution for a and b.
The “Data” line represents S/W = 0.87, the value at the end of 2005 for the mutual fund industry.





























































FIG. 6—Priors for alpha: constant versus decreasing returns to scale. For each value of the aggregate
allocation to active management (S/W), the ﬁgure displays percentiles of the prior distribution for alpha
underconstantreturnsto scale(Panel A)and decreasingreturnsto scale(Panel B), whereαt = a−b(S/W)t.
The prior for a is displayed as the solid line in Panel A of Figure 2. Under constant returns to scale, the
prior for b is dogmatic at b = 0. Under decreasing returns to scale, the prior for b has a mean of 0.1 and is
displayed in Panel B of Figure 2. The ordering of the ﬁve lines in the plots is the same as in the legend box.
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FIG. 7—Equilibrium active allocation: robustness to priors. For alternative speciﬁcations of priors,
the ﬁgure plots the fully competitive equilibrium aggregate allocation to active management (S/W), which
appears as the solid curve in Figure 5 under the original prior speciﬁcation. Panel B maintains the original
speciﬁcation prob(a < 0) = 0.01 and considers three values—0.6, 0.8, and 1.0—for the “prior S/W,”
which is the equilibrium allocation based only on prior beliefs. The same three prior S/W values are then
used with each of two alternative values of prob(a < 0): Panel A uses prob(a < 0) = 0.001, and Panel C
uses prob(a < 0) = 0.1. Panel D treats the case in which b is known with certainty to equal the value on
the horizontal axis; this case speciﬁes prob(a < 0) = 0.01 and considers the same three prior S/W values.

























































FIG. 8—Expected future industry size conditional on given future performance. This ﬁgure plots the
expected values of S/W, the fully competitive equilibriumaggregate allocation to active management, over
20 future years for different t-statistics of the future sample estimate of the active industry’s alpha. Panel A
plots the expected values of S/W conditional on future t-statistics of -2, 0, and 2 under decreasing returns
to scale. In this case, future active returns are simulated based on the posteriors of a and b represented by
the solidlines in Figure 2. Panel B plots the futurevalues of S/W implied by three sets of futuret-statistics,
t > 0.15, t = 0, and t < −0.74, under constant returns to scale. In this case, b = 0 and the distributionof a
is normal with the same mean and variance as the posterior distributionof α in Figure 4.





























































Panel C.  Posterior std dev of a (b=0)















Panel D.  Posterior std dev of b (b=0)
FIG. 9—Speed of learning about a and b. Panels A and B plot the evolution of selected percentiles of
the distributions of the posterior standard deviations of a and b, respectively, over 20 future years under
decreasing returns to scale. In this case, future active returns are simulated based on the posteriors of a and
b represented by the solid lines in Figure 2. Panel C plots the evolutionof the posteriorstandard deviationof
a over 20 future years under constant returns to scale. In this case, b = 0 and the distributionof a is normal
with the same mean and variance as the posteriordistributionof α in Figure 4. Panel D simply indicates that
the posterior standard deviation of b under constant returns to scale is zero. The ordering of the ﬁve lines in
Panels A and B is the same as in the legend box.
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